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A person buying or selling or holding shares in a close corporation having, say,
half a dozen shareholders may deem himself seriously aggrieved by misrepresenta-
tions, half-truths or non-disclosures or by stock sales that dilute his position and yet
never pause to consider the prospects for relief that perhaps are offered by the
Securities Act of 1933, hereafter called the Securities Act, or the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,2 hereafter called the Exchange Act. His lawyer in all probability has had
little occasion to familiarize himself with that legislation. To one who has not
followed some of the developments within the past few years, those statutes are
thought of as an attempt to deal solely with "public issues" of securities and the
practices of promoters, underwriters, stock brokers and dealers, stock market manip-
ulators, and similar players in the game of high and low finance whose doings affect
the stock exchanges or at any rate the investing "public." All this legislation, he
suspects, has nothing to do with a private fight between John Doe and Richard Roe
involving the issue or sale of some shares in the local Doe-Roe, Inc., which owns and
operates a department store on Main Street.
Well, he may eventually turn out to be right. The Supreme Court has not
spoken yet on the reach of federal law into this close corporation area and the extent
of that reach is not beyond controversy. Meanwhile, the doctrines that the lower
federal courts have been developing cannot be overlooked. To illustrate:
The Slavins (tvo brothers) owned one-half of the stock of two affiliated corpora-
tions. The Kardons (father and son) owned the other half. The Slavins, unknown
to the Kardons, made a deal to sell the corporate properties to certain outside in-
telests for $i,5oo,ooo, plus certain additional benefits. Then, without disclosing this
deal, the Slavins bought out the Kardons for $504,000. When the Kardons found
this out, they brought this action in the federal court against the Slavins, alleging
these facts as violations of the Exchange Act, Section io(b), and of the SEC Rule
under that Act, Rule X-ioB-5, to make the Slavins account for the profits made by
them through the sale of those corporate assets.3 The Kardons were successful, both
*Professor of Law, Duke University.
X 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U. S. C. §77a ei seq. (1946). This Act will be cited here-
after in text and footnotes by section number only.
a48 STAT. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U. S. C. §78a et seq. (1946). This Act will be cited here-
after in text and footnotes by section number only.
' A request in the prayer for relief against the outside purchaser, National Gypsum Co., was abandoned
by stipulation.
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on the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of
actions4 and on the merits.5
The point that stands out in that case, at this stage of our discussion, is that here
was a federal law reaching into a purely private fight between the two families of a
close corporation over a sale of shares in that corporation involving no kind of
organized "market" and nothing remotely resembling "public investors" or public
solicitation to buy or sell.
Although the question whether the Exchange Act was meant to apply only to
securities traded on a national exchange or in the over-the-counter market main-
tained by brokers and dealers may not have been expressly raised in the Kardon
case,6 later cases have expressly recognized the point. Except for one unreported
District Court case,7 later reversed on this point, the decisions have held that this
federal legislation reaches even such "private" transactions.'
LIABILITY PROVISIONS PERTINENT TO DEALS IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS
The specific sections of this federal legislation which will ordinarily be invoked
in a grievance relating to shares in a close corporation boil down to just about two
sections giving rise to civil liability: Section 2(2) of the Securities Act and Section
io(b) of the Exchange Act as implemented by the SEC's Rule X-ioB-5.
The other civil liability sections of this legislation will in general be inapplicable
to deals in shares of a close corporation. Thus, Section 12(1) of the Securities Act
will not come into play ;for that section imposes civil liability only for a sale in
violation of Section 5-that is, a sale of an unregistered security which is by that Act
required to be registered or a sale of a registered security without a proper prospectus.
By virtue of express exemptions, there is no requirement for the registering (and
hence there will be no registering) of a security that is sold by "any person other
than an issuer, underwriter or dealer" or that is sold even by an issuer if the trans-
action is one "not involving any public offering."' The quoted words will exempt
from registration just about any deal involving shares of a close corporation, even a
new "issue" sold by that corporation in raising additional capital from erstwhile
outsiders, so long as in the process of finding the contributing capitalist (we may
almost call him the incoming partner) the corporation does not advertise generally
and does not solicit so many persons as to make a "public" offering."' For similar
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E. D. Pa. 1946).
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E. D. Pa. 1947); same, on request for further
findings of fact, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E. D. Pa. 1947).
0 See remarks of Grim, J., in Robinson v. Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145, 149 n. 6 (E. D. Pa. ig5o).
'Fratt v. Robinson, D. C. Wash. July 3r, x95i, No. 2765, rev'a, 203 F. 2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
'Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 Supp. 954 (N. D. Ill. 1952); Robinson v.
Difford, supra note 6, noted 64 HAtv. L. REv. ioi8 (ig5i). See also Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 8o8, 830 (D. Del. 1951), on merits, motion for summary judgment for the defendant having
been previously denied, 71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 5947).
The provisions under discussion also give rise to criminal liability, as does the federal mail frauds
statute, 18 U. S. C. §134I (946 ed. Supp. V). The possibility of administrative or injunctive action
by the SEC can just about be eliminated in a discussion of close corporations.
"0 Securities Act, 4(I), relating to exempt transactions.
'
1 See Sec. Act Rel. No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935), CCH Fw. SEc. LAw SERv. 2266.17 (opinion of Gen.
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reasons, the much discussed liability under Section ii of the Securities Act does
not touch the dose corporation situation, since that liability is for misstatements
and omissions in the Registration Statement, a document which does not make its
appearance in the case of dose corporations. The only other section in the Securities
Act that could be the basis of liability, Section 17(a),"2 is so identical in wording
with Rule X-ioB-5 that it had better be considered in the later discussion of that
Rule.
The irrelevance to the close corporation of certain private-remedy sections is also
true of the Exchange Act. Section 9(e) of that Act imposes liability for designated
practices with respect to listed securities. Section i6, imposing liability on insiders
for "short swing" profits also applies only to listed securities. Section i8 imposes
liability for making false or misleading statements in certain documents filed under
the Exchange Act but, here again, close corporations make no such filings.
We return, then, to the sections pertinent to the close corporation situation. Since
the technical pattern of these sections is so crucial to the discussion that follows,
that discussion is incomprehensible unless we have before us the exact language of
those sections.
[Securities Act]. Section 12. Any person who ...
(2) sells a security [whether or not exempted from registration] by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of
the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person pur-
chasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest
thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security,
or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
eral Counsel of SEC). Despite the rejection, in that opinion of the number 25 as a rule of thumb for
establishing the "private offering" exemptions, it is quite probable that the solicitation of that small a
number of offerees with whom the shares could reasonably be expected to "come to rest" (not acquired
simply as a step in further resales), would not require registration of the" security under the Securities
Act, particularly if the solicitation is among the friends, relatives, and acquaintances of the management.
See Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (W. D. Pa. i95i) (no registration required where de-
fendant sold 32 shares among friends and persons introduced through mutual business acquaintances).
There is even a suggestion in the case last cited that the amount offered for sale may be so small (in
that ease about $4000) that it cannot be construed as a "public issue." That may be an overstatement.
See also Siebenthaler v. Aircraft Accessories Corp. (unreported), CCH FaD. SEc. LAw. SERv. 9o,522
(W. D. Mo. 1940) (an offering to three shareholders of another corporation). The SEC's contention
that an offering is still a public offering and is not exempt simply because made only to "key employees"
was upheld in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U. S. ii9 (1953); it may be noted that the offering in
question was to several hundred employees, including those with duties of clerical assistant, copywriter,
electrician, stock clerk, office clerk, order credit trainee, and stenographer.
"' There is a remote possibility that the "anti-touting" provisions of §17(b) of the Securities Act might
be involved in a sale of shares in a close corporation if the shares are sold by a "dealer," but the likelihood
is so remote as to justify no more than this brief footnote reference.
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The only observations about this Section that need be made at this point are that:
(i) it reaches even sales of exempt securities, with an exception irrelevant to this
discussion; (2) it protects buyers against sellers, not vice versa; and (3) it hits at
untruths and half truths in statements, rather than "pure" non-disclosures. We may
add that the liability is subject to a short period of limitations: one year after dis-
covery has been made or should have been made by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence; and in any event no more than 3 years after the sale' 3-the so-called one-and-
three period.
The other pertinent provision is a rule promulgated by the SEC, based upon the
statutory authorization in Section io(b) of the Exchange Act, 4 as follows:1"
Rule X-ioB-5. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
In choosing the language for the above Rule X-ioB-5, the SEC took as its model
the words of Section x7(a) of the Securities Act, of some nine years before, which
deserves to be reproduced here because of its own independent importance as well as
for the light which it sheds on Rule X-IoB-5:
[Securities Act] Section 17. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the sale of any
securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(i) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
One observes that Rule X-ioB-5 seems to cover everything that falls within Sec-
tions 12(2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act; not only does it hit at both the wrongdoing
seller and the wrongdoing buyer (unlike the Securities Act sections) but its clause
"Securities Act, §r3.
" [Exchange Act] "Sec. so. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
25 17 CODE FED. Pas. §24o.sob-5 (1949).
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(2) may itself take in all of Section 12(2), leaving clauses (i) and (3) as further
expansions of even a buyer's cause of action. The awkwardness of this statutory
structure gives rise to a perplexing problem, as we shall see.
There is one further provision that might give rise to a private cause of action
in the close corporation deal. It is conceivable that the buyer or seller of shares in
a close corporation might resort to a broker' 6 to negotiate the deal, or that the holder
of such shares might even sell to a dealer1' who in turn resells. Such might be the
case, for instance, if the buyer is an insider who wants to conceal his identity from
the selling shareholder or if the insider wants to sell out and prefers to have the
purchase-inducing misrepresentations made by the intermediary. For misdeeds
of the broker or dealer in such a transaction the aggrieved seller or buyer could, in
addition to Rule X-IoB-5, invoke against the broker or dealer Section i5(c) (i) of
the Exchange Act, which provides that
No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce the purchase or sale of, any
security ... [off a national securities exchange] by means of any manipulative, deceptive
or other fraudulent device or contrivance ... 18
Further consideration of the above Section (together with the Rule thereunder)
will be excluded from this discussion, both because of the remoteness of its applica-
tion to the close corporation and because of the co-extensive reach of Rule X-IoB-5
which addresses its similarly worded proscriptions to "any person in connection with"
a sale or purchase of a security and is accordingly broad enough to include brokers. 9
One notes, then, that even in a close corporation deal there can be overlappings of
various sections in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act; thus, in the rather
improbable case where a broker is involved in a close corporation deal, his proscribed
doings prejudicing a buyer can at the same time be a violation of the Securities Act
Section 17(a), the Securities Act Section 12(2)2" and the Exchange Act Section
15(c) (i), not to speak of the long arm of X-ioB-5.
THE BASIS o1 THE FEDERAL REACH INTO "PRIVATE" DF.Ais-m CLOSE CORPORATION
The case for the extension of the federal laws into such a private deal as that in-
volved in the Kardon case rests primarily on the literal language of the above quoted
sections. They proscribe malpractices in any "sale" and in any "purchase or sale."
It is to be noted, say the proponents of such extension, that sale or purchase is not
" Le., one engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.
Exchange Act §3(4).
"Le., one engaged in the business of buying or selling securities for his own account. Exchange
Act §3(5).
" This Section has been implemented by SEC rules defining the "devices or contrivances" that are
to be included within the designation "manipulative, deceptive or otherwise fraudulent." Rule X-15CX-2,
17 CODE FED. RFos. §240.5cI-2 (1949).
"s In the Matter of Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., Exch. Act Rel. No. 4699, April 8, 1952, CCH FED. SEC.
L, w SERv. 76,xio; In the matter of M. S. Wien & Co., Exch. Act Rel. No. 3855, Sept. 17, 1946, CCH
FED. SEc. LAw SERv. 75,700. We pass over the question whether, under §29 of the Exchange Act, an
X-zoB-5 action may have a longer period of limitations than a §x5(c)(i) action.
20 Cady v. Murphy, 113 F. 2d 988 (ist Cir. 1940).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
defined as, or otherwise expressly limited to, transactions upon the stock exchanges
or in other marts of the professionals; indeed, Section io(b) of the Exchange Act,
on which Rule X-ioB-5 is based, expressly includes sales and purchases of a security
not registered on any exchange.
But, argues the opponent of extension, who concedes that the lower federal
courts are largely against himal an aggrieved seller (unlike a buyer), has to base
himself on the Exchange Act (and not on the Securities Act), and the Exchange
Act's very purpose is to cope with stock-market and over-the-counter evils, as is re-
vealed even by the following preamble (in part) of Section 2 of that Act, not to
speak of the rest of that Section:
Section 2. For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securities as com-
monly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with
a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control
of such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto, including transactions by
officers, directors, and principal security holders, to require appropriate reports, and to
impose requirements necessary to make such regulation and control reasonably complete
and effective, in order to protect interstate commerce, the national credit, the Federal
taxing power, to protect and make more effective the national banking system and Federal
Reserve System, and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in such
transactions. ....
So, continues the opponent of extension, although Section io(b) expressly includes
securities not registered on any stock exchange, that still means that the scope of the
Act does not extend beyond stock exchanges and over-the-counter markets.
But, says the proponent of extension, the "over-the-counter market" means the
whole wide world; any deal off the stock exchange is over-the-counter. He can
find support 2 To this writer, this particular argument of the proponents seems far
fetched. "Over-the-counter" is a strange term if all you mean is off the stock ex-
changes. 3 Certainly the sections of the Exchange Act relating to the over-the-counter
market show that those sections at least are concerned with the doings of pro-
fessionals,24 not with deals between two quasi-partners over their holdings in an in-
corporated partnership."
The opponent of extension will also contend (soundly, in this writer's view) that
the reference in the above-quoted Section 2 of the Exchange Act to officers, directors,
and principal security holders does not necessarily mean to include sales or pur-
21 Cases cited supra notes 4, 5, 6, and 8; ci. Fratt v. Robinson in the District Court, supra note 7.
22 In legislative history: H. R. RaP. No. 2307, 75th Cong. 3d Sess. 2 (1938): "Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the over-the-counter markets are deemed to include all transactions in securities
which take place otherwise than upon a national securities exchange." This quotation, however, is not
necessarily inconsistent with a limitation to professional trading channels. See Loss, SEcuRMEs RiouMA-
"IO' 709 (95i); Comment, 59 YALE L. J. 1120, I14o n. 95 (i95o).
"
2See Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F. 2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
"
4 E.g., §§x5 and 15A of the Exchange Act, being elaborate provisions for control (including self-
policing) of brokers and dealers.
"
5 See Recent Cases, 64 HAtv. L. REV. ioi8, oi9 (i95x); cf. CCH FED. SEc. LAw SntRV. 22,97i.oz:
"'Over-the-counter market' as used in this bill refers to a market maintained off a regular exchange
by one or more dealers or brokers. ... (Mr. Rayburn, 78 CoIJO. RaC. 770o April 30, 1934).
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chases by insiders in close corporations; that reference still can reasonably relate
to organized markets and serve, for instance, to anticipate the insider's liability for
"short swing profits" in listed securities under Section i6(b) of the Exchange Act.
A better argument for extension of this legislation beyond the "markets" is that
the preamble of a statute is not to be relied upon to change fairly plain and un-
ambiguous provisions,2" particularly when it would be quite natural for a preamble
in a statute aimed at malpractices to single out for mention only those more crucial
areas in which the malpractices occur.
Moreover, contends the proponent of extension, certainly in the other statute, the
Securities Act, there is nothing (in preamble or elsewhere) that excludes a private
deal from its coverage. Quite the contrary: Section 17(a) of that Act applies even
to exempt securities, by an express provision to that effect,2T and regardless of
whether the transaction in question is so "private" as to fall within the exemption
(already noted) from the registration requirements of that Act s (Also, nothing
in the language of Section x2(a), above quoted, suggests that any "private" deal
is beyond the reach of that Section.) It would be illogical, on the strength of an
ambiguous phrase in the preamble of the Exchange Act, to restrict the reach of
X-ioB-5 under that Act to "public" transactions when it is so obvious that the
language used in X-ioB-5 is identical to that of Section 17(a), which in turn covers
even private deals.
Furthermore, Section To(b) perhaps shows on its face an intention to go beyond
the "public interest" mentioned in the preamble, for Section io(b)'s mandate to
the SEC is to "prescribe rules and regulations necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." (Italics supplied.) Judge Kirkpatrick
in the Kardon case apparently took the position that one is an "investor" within the
meaning of that section even if he is half owner of a close corporation;29 and the
latest judicial pronouncement is to the effect that, although in general the Exchange
Act is directed at transactions involving professional handlers of security transfers,
Sec. io(b) aims to go further, else there would be an incentive for crooked deals to
by-pass the organized markets0 °
Finally, say the proponents of extension, both the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act define "security"'" so as to include a list of things that do not lend themselves
to trading in markets, including "investment contracts" which in turn may be pro-
" See Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R:. R. v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174, 188 (i889); 2 SUTHERLAND,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoxsrRuc-oN §4820 (3 d ed., Horack, 1943); CRAwFORa, STATUTORY CoN-
STRuCTION §205 (1940).
" Securities Act §17(c): "The exemptions provided in section 3 shall not apply to the provisions of
this section." Section 3 of the Securities Act enumerates the securities that are exempt from most
provisions of that Act.
2' By §4() of the Securities Act "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering," as well
as "transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter or dealer" enjoy an exemption, true,
but that exemption is only from the provisions of §5, which in turn deals only with requirements with
respect to registration of a security and to prospectuses.
"0 See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., supra note 4, at 514.
" See Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F. 2d 627 (9 th Cir. 1953).
" Securities Act, §2(1); Exchange Act §3(0); See Comment, 59 YALE L. J. 112o, 114o n. 95 (i95O).
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motional schemes disguised in the lamb's clothing of a mere land-purchase contract."
Many of the "Ponzi," "switch," and "front money" schemes 3 involved in criminal
prosecutions presumably could be violations of X-ioB-5 as well as of Section 17(a),
although they do not involve the type of "security" one expects to find traded in the
professionals' "market. '34
It would seem, on the whole, that the scheme of these statutes is to reach all
sales and purchases of securities, as a general approach, and then to make express
exemption of specific situations where such exemption is intended. One may venture
a prediction that the upper courts will uphold the extension of X-ioB-5 into deals
involving transfers of shares in close corporations. But the opponent of such ex-
tension might suceed in one further last ditch stand: this federal legislation should
not be interpreted so as to concern itself with transactions which involve neither
the organized exchange nor the over-the-counter markets maintained by professionals
nor the danger of resort to private deals in order to by-pass the federal legislation
nor a scheme to buy from or sell to a sufficiently substantial circle of persons so as
to warrant more than mere local state-law concern. This reasoning rests more on
general considerations relating to our system of dual sovereignty, even aside from
any constitutional question. In the eventual decisions of the upper courts, much may
depend on the temper of the times and on the swing of the pendulum between lean-
ings toward centralization or toward decentralization.
It may also be worthy of note that the SEC interprets X-ioB-5 as reaching into
close corporations, which in turn may have some effect on judicial interpretation in
the same direction3 5
Ti- PARAuox OF THE "IMPLIE" CIVIL LIABILITY PROVISIONs, EsPECIALLY X-IoB-5
No express mention of any civil liability of the violator in favor of the aggrieved
party is made by X-ioB-5 or Section 17(a) of the Securities Act or Section x5(c) (1)
of the Exchange Act. Those sections are on their face simply "thou shalt not" pro-
nouncements. One might contend that violations of these provisions were intended
to be subjected only to criminal liability and to the regulatory sanctions administered
by the SEC. Nevertheless, X-IoB-5 in particular has been held by the courts to
impose civil liability by implication, 6 although there is more doubt as to whether
"For a criminal conviction for violation of §17(a) of the Securities Act in the sale of such a
"security," see United States v. Earnhardt, 153 F. 2d 472 (7th Cir. 1946).
"3 io SEC ANN. REP. 144 ff. (1944).
"E.g., the fraud on members of a club in United States v. Monjar, 147 F.2d g16 (3d Cir. 5944).
"See Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954, 961 (N. D. I11. 1952).
" In addition to cases cited supra notes 4-8 inc., the reported cases include: Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., x88 F. 2d 783 (ad Cir. 195I); Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F. 2d 799 (3d Cir. 1948);
Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S. D. N. Y. 1949); Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E. D.
Pa. 1947); see also Acker v. Schulte, 74 F. Supp. 683 (S. D. N. Y. 1947). The doctrine has bcen
recognized in cases where, for other reasons, the plaintiff was unsuccessful: Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio
& Television Corp., 198 F. ad 883 (2d Cir. 1952), afl'g 99 F. Supp. 701 (S. D. N. Y. 1955); Birnbaum
v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F. 2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952). There are many unreported cases, to the same
effect, mentioned in Loss, SEcurunEs REouLxArom 827 n. 62 (ig5i). Loss states (id. at 1049) that the
Kardon case "has since been followed in almost two score other cases by seven other District Courts,
almost all of them under Rule X-ioB-5."
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this is true in favor of an aggrieved buyer, as will be seen in a moment. Indeed, the
implied liability aspect of the Kardon case, which was the first judicial recognition
of this liability, caused much more of a stir in legal circles than did the close corpora-
tion aspect of the transaction there involved. One theory upon which the decisions
rest is the common law tort doctrine recognizing a private action in favor of those
persons whose interests are intended to be protected by a statute even though the
statute may express only a criminal sanction 7 Another theory is that Section 2g(b)
of the Exchange Act not only expressly makes contracts that violate the Act "void"3
but also was amended 9 so as to impose a short period of limitation in private actions
for violation of any rule under Section 15(c) (i), a Section which is equally silent
about civil liability; all of which seems, therefore, to recognize an implied liability
theory.4 ° Although such "voidness" might understandably be deemed sufficient for
rescission, it has been said to be also sufficient for a cause of action for money
damages under one of these "silent" sections 1
This judicial creation of an "implied" civil liability brings up a statutory paradox.
To spotlight this paradox we shall have to refer, however briefly, to some statutory
provisions beyond those applicable to close corporations.
By its express civil liability provisions, the Securities Act carefully lays out the
rights and remedies of an aggrieved buyer, as well as the deliberate limitations there-
on. Thus, if one acquires a registered security with respect to which an effective
registration statement contains material misstatements or omissions, he has, under
the famed Section ii of the Securities Act, a cause of action against a formidable
array of persons (signers, directors, experts, underwriters, issuer, etc.), all with care-
ful and intricate provisions (which would just about fill three of these pages) relative
to privity, reliance, scienter, burden of proof of specific issues under detailed varia-
tions, standards of reasonableness, amount of recovery, indemnity for costs and fees
in litigation. By Section 12(l) of the Securities Act one who buys a security that
ought to have been but has not been registered, or buys a registered security without
being given the required prospectus, has rights against his immediate seller, again
with certain limitations. Finally, Section i2(2) of the Securities Act, quoted in
previous pages, protects, but again with certain restrictions, the buyer who is sold by
untruths and half-truths. It is arguable, therefore, that the express liability sections
were meant to set forth the only rights of the buyer not only with respect to certain
malpractices in special circumstances, as in Sections ii and 12(1) of the Securities
Act, but also as to the general area of misrepresentations which induce purchases and
which prejudice the buyer. (However, one might point out that this legislative
'TRESATEMENT TORTS, §§286-288; Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46
H-v. L. REV. 453 (1933); Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, x6 MINN. L. REv.
361 (1932).
" Both theories were invoked by the court in the Kardon case, supra note 4.
" Public Act No. 719, §3, 7 5 th Cong., 3 d Sess. (1938).
"
0 See Comment, 59 YALE L. J. i12o, 1134 (1950).
"'See Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876, 878 (S. D. N. Y. 194).
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pattern still leaves gaps even as to buyer-plaintiffs, e.g., liability of a fraudulent
accountant in a close corporation deal-hence not within Sections ii or 12.)
Into this neat statutory scheme bursts X-ioB-5 purporting to redress all grievances
in the securities field, giving causes of actions to everybody, buyer and seller alike,
and for all bad deeds-and by implication at that. There is hardly a misdeed
proscribed by Sections ii or x2 of the Security Act (or by various sections of the
Exchange Act) that could not be brought within the language of X-ioB-5. What
now, then, of all that care taken in the Securities Act for the more restricted pro-
tection of buyers? Shall X-xoB-5 be, therefore, limited to the protection of sellers?
But its very language expressly covers both purchases and sales. And if, despite its
inclusion of both, it were to be construed to give a private remedy only to aggrieved
sellers, such sellers would be better off than aggrieved buyers, who, it is recalled, are
hemmed in by many restrictions in their recoveries under the express liability sections.
The implied liability of the Kardon doctrine under X-ioB-5 creates a paradox
however one views X-ioB-5; the courts' dilemma is well put by Loss:42
Should they permit buyers to sue under X-xoB-5 and thus ignore the safeguards which
Congress chose to throw around buyers' actions in Sections xx and 12? Or should they
restrict the Kardon doctrine to suits by sellers (or at any rate, non-buyers) and thus treat
the seller stepchild far better than the buyer favorite son-not to mention the fact that
any discrimination between seller and buyer would fly in the face of Section io(b) and
the rule [Rule X-ioB-5].
Small wonder, then, that the courts have disagreed on the way out of the dilemma.
Some of the federal district courts limit the Kardon doctrine of implied civil liability
to sellers, on the theory that the statutory remedy for buyers, at least in the area of
misrepresentations in the sale (whether by untruths, half-truths or otherwise), is
carefully, specifically, and expressly set out in these Acts, particularly in Sections xx
and 12 of the Securities Act43 By that view the rights of a buyer of shares in a
close corporation against his seller under this federal legislation would be worked
out solely through Section 12(2), with all its limitations. (Except perhaps where
the seller is a broker or dealer, under Section 15(c) (1) of the Exchange Act, above
discussed. Liability under that Section has a short period of limitations.)4 4 Even
that view would not bar an X-xoB-5 action by a buyer against some third party
culprit, e.g., an accountant preparing false statements.
On the other hand, other federal courts, including the only Court of Appeals that
has passed on the point as of this writing, view the X-IoB-5 implied liability as
applying even in favor of buyers against sellers.45 One case suggests that perhaps
" Loss, SEcumInEs REGULATIoN 1055 (951).
" Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 8o F. Supp. 123 (E. D. Pa. 1948); Montague v. Electronic Corp.
of America, 76 F. Supp. 933 (S. D. N. Y. 1948); and see Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 9 F. R. D.
707 (S. D. N. Y. 1949), resd 188 F. 2d 783 (2d Cir. 195i).
"Exchange Act, §29(b).
" Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F. 2d 783 (2d Cir. i95i), rev'g 9 F. R. D. 707 (S. D. N. Y.
1949); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S. D. N. Y. 1949). See also Frank, J. (dissenting on another
point) in Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 198 F. 2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
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this is true only if the buyer's grievance rests on the buyer's "proof of fraud" over
and above the proof that he needs to make out a buyer's cause of action under the
express civil liability sections. That case perhaps can be viewed as an attempt to
fit Rule X-IoB-5 and the mandate in its statutory source, Section lo(b), to regulate
both sales and purchases, into the statutory scheme for buyers along these lines:
so long as the buyer claims the benefit of the proof-burdens put upon the seller or
of the scienter-dilution under the express liability sections, he is subject to the restric-
tions in those sections; if he is willing to take on the burden of proof (especially, proof
of seller's knowledge of falsity of the statements in question), then the buyer can
use X-ioB-5 . This line of reasoning is perhaps also applicable to the use of Section
17(a) as a basis of implied liability in favor of the buyer, if one does not mind mag-
nifying the paradoxY'
If one were to harmonize the buyer's remedies under X-ioB-5 with the careful
express liability provisions by construing X-ioB-5 as applying only to those statutory
provisions tailored specifically to the practices and malpractices bf security trading
for which no express liability is mentioned, that would limit the buyer's use of
X-IoB-5 to certain situations under the Exchange Act, rarely applicable to the close
corporation picture. (E.g., purchase by a customer of securities induced by a broker
who does not reveal, in violation of Rule X-i5oi-5,4s that he controls the issuer 49 -
which in the rare case might involve a block of stock in a close corporation.) The
most recent judicial pronouncement (as of this writing) is a thesis by Judge Frank
apparently to the effect that the subsequent overlapping by X-ioB-5 of previous
specific sections creating liability-with-restrictions is a determination by the SEC,
valid under the authorization of Section io(b), that the SEC did not deem it "neces-
sary or appropriate" (in the language of said Section) to require those restrictions in
any X-ioB-5 liability, whether overlapping or not.59
In all probability, whatever happens to the buyer, the seller's private remedy under
X-IoB-5 seems fairly well entrenchedV 1
USE OF MEANS OR INSTRUMENTALITIES OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OR MAILS
By their express provisions, traceable in turn to the limited powers of Congress,
" See Frank, J., in Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., supra note 43, at 786-787. In judge Frank's
remark that "proof of fraud is required in suits under ... Rule X-ioB-5," he probably did not mean that
"fraud" (with whatever its scienter requirement may be) must always be established under Rule X-IoB-5,
for it would appear that under paragraph (b) of the Rule (the paragraph relating to untruths and non-
disclosures), no greater degree of "fraud" is necessary than in, say, a §X2(2) case under the Securities
Act. It is more likely that he meant that under X-ioB-5 the buyer plaintiff must carry the burden of
proof of establishing that the truth is otherwise than as was stated or half-stated by the defendant.
" In Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., sura note 43, at 787 n. 2, §17(a) was included in passing with
X-xoB-5 as creating implied liability in favor of the buyer. See criticism by Loss, SEcuRiTiES REou.ArToN
io6o (i9s').
"' 17 CODE FED. REOs. §240.15c1-5 (I949).
"'See Loss, SEcmuTiEs REotu-AnoN IO63 (951). Loss's entire discussion of the point under
consideration is an excellent analysis, pp. I054-Io65.
"o Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 198 F. 2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 5952) (in a dissent
by judge Frank on another point).
" See cases cited supra note 36, and cross reference therein.
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these federal statutes do not apply to a transaction in which, to do the proscribed
act, no use is made of the "mails" or of "any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce."5  (In this discussion of close corporations, we can disregard the use
of "any facility of any national securities exchange," a basis of jurisdiction mentioned
in the Exchange Act.) Those are the words used in the Exchange Act and in
Rule X-ioB-5 ; in the Securities Act, the words used, besides "mails," are "any means
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce." 3 It is
doubtful that the difference in language is anything more than an attempt in the
later Act to find a less awkward phrase than that used in the earlier Act. There
exist other minor differences in statutory language relating to the use of federal
channels. 4
It is conceivable that a transaction relating to shares in a close corporation might
avoid these federal channels. To put a rather strong illustration: Seller A, living
and having his office in city X, sells his holdings in a close corporation to buyer B
of the same city; all the negotiations are held in A's office; to attend these conferences
neither A nor B, nor any significant representative of theirs, uses an interstate train,
bus or plane, not even between points within the state; there is no use of the mails,
nor is an interstate phone-call made, not even to make the appointments; delivery of
the securities is made by A handing them over to B in A's office; B pays by handing
over his check on a local bank 5 and walks out with the securities. In such a case
the aggrieved party may have to look to local law for redress; the federal statutes
would seem inapplicable.
But suppose that after making the oral contract of sale and receiving payment,
all in face-to-face dealing, the seller mails the securities to the buyer or makes de-
livery by transporting them across state lines? By the view taken by some courts in
construing Section 12(2) of the Securities Act, in civil liability cases based on that
Section, the Act would not be violated because the misleading statements were not
transmitted through the designated facilities,"0 i.e., mails, or facilities of interstate
communication or transportation. By that view, if the only communications are
oral, it would take the use of interstate telephone or radio to make that Section
"
5 Exchange Act, §so(b), supra p. 5o8; §i5(c)(r), supra p. 509.
'Securities Act, §§12(2), 17(a), supra pp. 507, 508.
=' To do certain acts "by the use of" the designated interstate facilities is what is forbidden by some
provisions, including those in X-roB-5; other sections forbid "to make use of" those facilities to do the
forbidden act. One dares not predict whether courts will find differences between this Tweedlc-dec
and Tweedle-dum.
" A "local bank" has been used in this illustration out of excess of caution. Whether the use of
the mails in clearing an out-of-town check would bring the transaction within these statutes is another
question. See note 64 infra.
50Kemper v. Lohnes, x73 F. 2d 44 (7 th Cir. 1949); Siebenthaler v. Aircraft Accessories Corp. (un-
reported), CCH FaD. Sac. LAw Sa.Rv. 9o,r=2 (W. D. Mo. 1940) (not clear whether the point was really
essential to the decision.)
Dicta dropped en passant can be found to the same effect in Independence Shares Corp., v. Deckert,
io8 F. ",d 51, 54 (3d Cir. 1939); Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466, 469 (D. Me. X939).
Cf. Gross v. Independence Shares Corp., 36 F. Supp. 541 (E. D. Pa. 1941), announcing a different
theory why the mere delivery through the designated facilities does not incur liability under §12, See
infra, text to note 75.
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applicable. If that view is precluded by the slightly different language of X-roB-5 ,
as has been judicially recognized 7 that again would bring up the paradox problem
if a buyer seeks to sue under those provisions. Admittedly, that is one possible
interpretation of that awkward phrase in Section 12(2): "any person who ... sells
a security . . . by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or com-
munication in interstate commerce ... by means of a prospectus or oral communica-
tion."
As against this narrow interpretation another equally possible and perhaps more
plausible interpretation is that the civil liability of Section 2(2) applies whenever
misleading written or oral statements are made in the sale of a security, regardless
of the channels through which they are made, provided that the sale otherwise in-
volves the use of the designated federal channels, at least by the seller. Accordingly
it has been held that the civil liability imposed by Section 12(2) applies even though
the mails"8 or interstate transportation facilities 9 are not used until making delivery
of the security after the contract of sale. This broad interpretation is more con-
sistent with the purpose of the Act and with its terminology, in the light of the
doctrine that the Federal Government is one of delegated specific powers, not one of
general powers-a doctrine which time and again accounts for the strange structure
of federal legislation. The federal securities legislation was enacted as an attempt
at regulation of securities transactions because regulation by the states was either
non-existent, ineffective or circumvented by dealings across state lines, particularly
from an operational base in a state without blue sky laws.60 If Congress had
general legislative power, it is fair to assume that the mails-and-interstate-facilities
element would never have appeared in the legislation; instead, we would have had
a plain statement: he who sells by lies and half-truths is liable. The reference in
the legislation under discussion to mails and interstate facilities should be viewed
not as making lie-transmission through those channels the gist of the offense but
rather, as hitting at all sales by the forbidden misrepresentations, non-disclosures, and
schemes in transactions within the reach of the federal power that is brought into
play by the use of the mails and interstate facilities. To adopt the narrow view
would open the field again for the sharp promoter: he could cover the country with
"talking agents" or see to it that they are supplied with locally printed prospectuses.
The only decision upholding the narrow view of the requirement of the use of mails
and interstate facilities which purports to give the problem anything resembling a
considered analysis contains, with all due respect, only question-begging reasoning in
its support.' Incidentally, the contrary broad view seems to be supported by the
legal writers.
62
"Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F. 2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
s Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F. 2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943).
Moore v. Gorman, 75 F. Supp. 453 (S. D. N. Y. 1948) (delivery by messenger by train from
Philadelphia to New York).
"As in Los Angeles Fisheries v. Crook, 47 F. 2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1931).
o' Kemper v. Lohnes, supra note 56.
O Loss, SeCRTsi 1SEGULATioN 1001-1003, 876-882 (950); Dean, The Federal Securities Act: I,
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It is perhaps significant that in cases of criminal liability for violation of Section
17(a) of the Securities Act, as well as for violation of the mail frauds statute,0 3 con-
victions have been upheld even where the designated media (mails, etc.) were not
used to transmit the actual misrepresentation.64 The slightly different language of
Section 17(a) as against Section i2(2) of the Securities Act lends itself more readily
to the interpretation that any use of the mails or interstate facilities which is in fur-
therance of a scheme to defraud in the sale of securities is within that Section."' In
turn, the language of X-ioB-5 (to use mails "in connection with" sale or purchase)
is even more favorable to the broad interpretation.6" Now then, if a defrauded
buyer who could invoke Section i2(2) of the Securities Act in a civil suit against the
seller can elect instead to proceed on the theory of the implied civil liability of
Section 17(a) of that Act, or of Rule X-ioB-5 (as embracing all that is within said
Section 17(a) as well as more), the buyer might succeed under the implied liability
theory where he would fail under the narrow interpretation of the express liability
provisions. Again, this brings up the paradox problem, already discussed and the
corresponding decisional uncertainty. As for the aggrieved seller, however, it has
been held that he can avail himself of the concededly broad mail-and-interstate-
facilities reach of X-ioB-5; 7 The mail-use requirement under X-IoB-5, even in a
civil liability case, has been judicially recognized as being closer to the language
of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act (as applied in criminal cases) than to that of
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act.08
Even intrastate use of the mails or, perhaps, of other media of transportation
or communication may be the basis of this federal "jurisdiction." As to the mails,
there is little doubt: use of mails to transmit between points in the same state is
8 FORTUNE 50, col. 2 (Aug. 1933); Douglas and Bates, The Federal Securities et Of 1933, 43 YALE
L. J. 171, 183 n.51 (1933). Notes: 59 YALE L. J. 1120 (950); 49 COL. L. REV. (x944); 50 YALE
L. J. go, Ioo-xoi (1940). See also the combined SEC and industry statement submitted in hearings
on the 1941 amendment program: PrososEa AMENDMENTS TO TBE Snctnu zas AcT oF 1933 AND TO "riE
Sacumn's AcT OF 1934, Hearings belore the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Part
3, 77th Cong., ist Sess. 8o6 (1941).
63 18 U. S. C. §1341 (Supp. 1952).
"' United States v. Monjar, i47 F. 2d 916 (3d Cir. 1944) (violations of both mail frauds statute
and Securities Act §17(a); the misrepresentations were made orally but the mails were used by de-
fendants in communicating with each other); United States v. Kopald, Quinn & Co. (unreported) CCH
FED. SEc. LAw SERv. 28ox.6 (U. S. Dist. Ct., N. Dist. Ga., Atlanta Div., April 9, 1937) (mailing
of confirmation of sale; violations of §17(a) of Securities Act), afl'd, Kopald-Quinn & Co. v. United
States, ioi F. 2d 6a8 (Sth Cir. 1939), cert. denied, Ricebaum v. United States, 307 U. S. 628 0939).
See also, in the Moniar case, supra, Judge McLaughlin's interpretation of Pace v. United States, 94
F. 2d 591 (5 th Cir. 1938) as holding that an offense under Securities Act, §17, is shown by the mailing
of letters expressing thanks for orders given to salesman. Under the mail frauds statute it need only
be shown that the mailing was in furtherance of a scheme to defraud, which can raise some nice
questions where the only use of the mails is, say, in the clearance of the victim's check on an out-of-
town bank. See Kann v. United States, 323 U. S. 88 (1944) and United States v. Sheridan, 329 U. S.
379 (1946), in their implications for that problem.
Or See §X7(a) quoted supra p. 508; see also Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F.
Supp. 954, 962-964 (N. D. Ill. x952).
" See last line of X-ioB-5, quoted supra p. 5o8; see also preceding footnote.
"' Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., supra note 65.
* Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., supra note 65.
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sufficient to satisfy the mail-use requirement of these statutes.6 9 As to media other
than the mails, it is entirely possible that the use of a "through" train or plane, which
is en route to out-of-state points, in transmitting the forbidden matter even between
points in the same state amounts to a "use of means or instruments of transportation
. . . in interstate commerce," the train or plane in question being such a "means"
or "instrument."70  It would seem rather far-fetched, however, to make a similar
conclusion with respect to a car moving only intrastate simply because it is traveling
along a route that leads to out-of state points. Query whether transportation of the
liar himself on his way to sell the victim, might not be the equivalent of trans-
porting false written matter. Perhaps it may plausibly be argued that a sale by use
of a long-distance phone call between two points in the same state is a sale by use
of "means or instruments of .. . communication in interstate commerce" where the
connection is automatic and the call may be automatically relayed through out-of-
state points, unknown to either party. In the leading case for the narrow view of
the reach of Section i2(2) of the Securities Act through federal channels, the oral
misrepresentations in a deal between a Chicago seller and a Chicago buyer were
made in Chicago, as also were payment and delivery-all apparently involving none
of the features above mentioned. 71
Under the broad view above indicated, however, it would seem that, at the least,
any use of the mails or interstate facilities in furtherance of the scheme would be
enough to bring into play the various civil liability sections of these federal statutes.7"
By that view a court should have little trouble in applying this legislation to a case
where the aggrieved party made contact by mail with the other party in answer to
an advertisement by the latter in a newspaper of interstate circulation and appoint-
ments for meetings were made by mail.7 3 (Perhaps such an advertisement itself
might be enough, even if followed by no mailings.) It does not follow, however,
even under the broad view, that if federal channels are used in any phase of the
transaction, the transaction is within the Acts; there might still be a question, for
example, where the only mailing involved is the inter-bank movement of the buyer's
check after it hhs been cashed by the seller at a bank other than the drawee bank.
7 4
Moreover, even under the broad view of the federal channels jurisdiction, it is
arguable, in a civil liability case under Section i2(2) of the Securities Act, that the
transportation of a security through the mails (etc.) is to be distinguished from other
" Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 39 F. Supp. 592 (E. D. Pa. 1941); Gross v. Independence
Shares Corp., 36 F. Supp. 541 (E. D. Pa. 1941). Both these cases were under §12(2). See to same
effect, in a suit by the SEC to enjoin fraudulent practices in sale of securities, SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28
F. Supp. 34 (N. D. Calif. 1939), appeal dismissed on stipulation, ax8 F. 2d 718 (gth Cir. 1941).
70 The statutory language under discussion is not like that of the Mann Act, 36 STAT. 825 (igio), x8
U. S. C. §398 (1946) forbidding transportation "in interstate commerce" (as defined in that Act),
which has been construed to exclude transportation between points in the same state. United States v.
Wilson, 266 Fed. 712 (E. D. Tenn. igzo) (indictment insufficient, even though the route taken inci-
dentally passed through another state). Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U. S. C. §201 et Seq.
(X946), employees driving cars between two points in the same state may be "engaged in interstate
commerce." Airlines Transp. v. Tobin, x98 F. 2d 249 (4th Cir. x952).
7' Kemper v. Lohnes, supra note 56. '-See cases cited supra note 64.
"' Cf. Kemper v. Lohnes, supra note 56. " See cases cited supra at end of note 64.
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aspects of the "sale" and that, accordingly, that Section does not apply if the only
use of the mails (etc.) is in carrying the security for delivery or for the purpose of
sale. The argument is highly technical: the word "sale" has the same meaning in
Section 12(2) as in Section 2(i); in turn, Section 12(1) imposes civil liability on
sellers for violation of Section 5; and Section 5 not only forbids use of the designated
federal channels "to carry or cause to be carried" a security, along with "to sell or
offer to buy," but it also forbids such carriage "for delivery after sale" as well as "for
the purpose of sale"--all of which (according to this argument) goes to show that
the forbidden "sale" imposing civil liability under Section i2(2) does not include
delivery. There is judicial support for this argument,75 as well as against it,70 the
latter bolstered by the fact that "sale" is defined in the Act to include delivery unless
the context otherwise requires.77
X-ioB-5 AND THE WRONGED SHAREHOLDER NOT A PURCHASER OR SELLER---"PRIVlTY"
Unless the act of which the plaintiff complains is "in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security," X-ioB-5 does not apply. Obviously X-ioB-5 does not
give then, a federal statutory cause of action for that range of wrongs to shareholders
which are categorized in our jurisprudence as breaches of fiduciary duties, where
no purchase or sale of securities is involved. Furthermore, the only reported case on
the point, the Birnbaum case," holds that even if a sale of securities is involved,
still there is no X-ioB-5 cause of action by one who is neither the purchaser nor
seller. Both the statutory provision upon which X-ioB-5 rests and the Rule itself,
said Judge A. N. Hand of the Second Circuit, are not directed at fraudulent mis-
management of corporate affairs but rather were meant as a protection to the de-
frauded seller or buyer. By this view, then, "selling the corporation down the river,"
as by a sale of its "control shares" to known corporation pirates, accompanied by
resignations and substitutions in favor of the purchasers, does not violate X-IoB-5,
even if it otherwise falls within "any device, scheme or artifice to defraud" or within
other phraseology of X-IoB-5. An unreported case is said, however, to take the
opposite view, presumably based on a more literal interpretation of the X-ioB-5
outlawry of practices which "would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security. '79
Indeed, this aggrieved-buyer-or-seller view of X-ioB-5 seems to have suffered a
further judicial twist in the recent Farnsworth Radio"0 case in the direction of a
" Gross v. Independence Shares Corp., 36 F. Supp. 541 (E. D. Pa. 1941).
" Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke Co., 134 F. 2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943); Moore v. Gorman, 75 F.
Supp. 453 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
"Securities Act §2(3).
s Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F. 2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), noted zoo U. oF PA. L. Rnv.
1251 (1952).
" McManus v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., Civ. No. 8015 (E. D. Pa. July 30, 1948), cited in Loss,
SEcuerras REruLATIoN 841 n. 104 (1953) and in Note, 4 STAN L. REv. 308, at 31o n. 5 (x952), and
in Note, ioo U. oF PA. L. REv. 1251, 1253 n. 15 (952).
so Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 198 F. 2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952), aff'g 99 F. Supp.
701 (S. D. N. Y. 1951), without opinion other than a brief per curiam statement that "the order is
affirmed on the opinion below ... and the subsequent decision in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp...
Frank, J. dissented.
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"privity" requirement under X-ioB-5 . In that case a person who bought stock on
the open market (from persons not parties to the misrepresentations) brought an
X-ioB-5 action against the directors who had published false information about the
corporation, as a result of which the stock was quoted higher than it otherwise
would have been and the plaintiff purchased the stock at a price which fell when
the truth became known. In dismissing the complaint (with leave to plead anew),
Sugarman, J., in the District Court, said that "a semblance of privity between the
vendor and purchaser ... seems to be requisite and is entirely lacking here." The
case has been strongly criticized as not even embodying the more enlightened com-
mon law attitudes towards privity in the misrepresentation area, much less the more
advanced statutory philosophy;"1 it has been further criticized as a non sequiturs2
from the Birnbaum rule (upon which the Court of Appeals purported to rely) that
X-ioB-5 protects only defrauded sellers or purchasers: here the aggrieved party was
a purchaser. However, there is an intimation in the District Court's opinion that
it would have held otherwise if the purchaser had relied on the false statement, an
intimation that might afford an X-ioB-5 basis for an action by one who buys into
or sells out of a corporation (whether it be a close corporation or a "public" corpora-
tion) on the basis of false information calculated to influence that purchaser or seller.
For instance, an accountant who prepares a false statement which he knows is to be
used in putting over a deal in shares of a corporation, close or otherwise, might
well fall within X-ioB-5, even under the Birnbaum reasoning. (This is aside from
the question, already discussed, of how far can X-ioB-5 be available to purchasers.)
Perhaps the "semblance of privity" mentioned in the Farnsworth Radio case is
merely another name for the requirement that the relying plaintiff must be of the
class whom the misrepresentation was intended to influence-an unfortunate name
for an over-conservative position even at common law. 3 The privity requirement,
in that sense, would seem readily satisfied if the nefarious scheme is specifically
aimed at a particular person, as would probably be the normal situation in deals in
shares of close corporations.
Neither the Birnbaum case nor the Farnsworth Radio case necessarily eliminates
X-ioB-5 as the basis of a shareholder's derivative suit where he complains that the
corporation has sold shares to dominating insiders at a wrongfully low price or has
bought shares from such insiders at a wrongfully high price, to the injury of the
corporation. The gist of such a complaint would be injury to the corporation as
purchaser or seller, and there would be no question about the "privity" of the corpora-
tion. The Birnbaum dictum that X-ioB-5 is not a redress for fraudulent mis-
management of corporate affairs would seem irrelevant in such a situation.s4
It is even possible that X-ioB-5 offers hope to the diluted shareholder in the classic
8 1 Note, 4 STAN. L. REv. 308 (1952); Frank, J., dissenting in the Farnsworth Radio case, supra note
8o, at 884 at seq.
s Frank, J., supra note 81.
8'See PRaossE, ToRrs 732 (194'); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 70, x74 N. E. 441 (1931).
' Cf. Note, ioo U. OF PA. L. REV. 1251, 1254 (1952).
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squeeze play in close corporations: the offering of a new issue at a ridiculously low
price (made to look innocent, perhaps, by offering it at par) to existing shareholders
with the knowledge that the minority-holder against whom the squeeze is directed
(say, the widow of the deceased 30 per cent shareholder) will be unable to take
the pro-rata portion, coupled with the expectation that any outside financing of a
purchase by the minority holder is unlikely. (In a publicly held corporation, a low-
price pre-emptive offering to shareholders does not present the same diluting dangers
-or at least only to a negligible degree.) The doctrine developed by state courts
has not always coped adequately with this problemYs  Perhaps a fresh start can
be made under X-IoB5. In the case where the squeeze play ends in the purchase
by the management-majority of the minority's shares at a cheap price, it is not
too difficult to find the aggrieved "seller." But even if the diluting pre-emptive offer
is not taken up by the shareholder who is the target of the scheme, with the result
that the shares in question are then sold to the insiders at that same low price, the
situation would seem to be one which, in the language of X-ioB-5, is a "device to
defraud" or an "act which operates as a fraud or deceit"--all "in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security." Indeed, it is even technically arguable that in
such a situation there has been a "sale" to the aggrieved shareholder: "sale" is de-
fined in the Securities Act to include any "offer to dispose of" a security and pre-
sumably has an equally broad meaning in the Exchange Act, particularly in view
of the almost identical language of X-IoB-5 under the Exchange Act and of Section
17(a) of the Securities Act.
Another question that arises under the view that the aggrieved party must be a
buyer or seller in order to come within X-ioB-5 is whether the change in a corpora-
tion's securities that occurs as a result of some fundamental change voted by the
shareholders is to be viewed as a sale of the "old" security and a purchase of the
"new" one; if so, a shareholder who can in other respects work up an X-ioB-5 case
can meet the seller-or-buyer requirement. True, the problem is less likely to occur
in close corporations than in publicly held corporations, since in a close corporation
the fully informed insiders frequently own that majority of the shares which enables
them to effect a charter amendment or a reincorporation (as by sale of assets for
the securities of the newly formed acquiring corporation) or such infrequent close
corporation transactions as merger or consolidation. Still, it is entirely possible that
even in a close corporation the vote of a shareholder outside the "management
group" is needed. For example, the applicable law may require a vote by classes
and the outsider may own the preferred; or that law may require the favorable vote
of 75 per cent of the shares and a few outsiders may own 26 per cent. Is there a
"sale" (or "purchase") when the rights of shares are changed by a fundamental
corporate alteration pursuant to such voting? To "sell" is defined in the legislation
" See 13 FLETCHER CoRPoRATI-oNs §5840 (I943 replac. vol.); Schramme v. Cowin, 2o5 App. Div.
2o, 199 N. Y. Supp. 98 (ist Dep't 1923); Scheirich v. Otis-Hidden Co., 205 Ky. 289, 264 S. W. 755
(1924). Cf. Steven v. Hale-Haas Co., 249 Wis. 205, 23 N. W. 2d 62o, 63o-631 (x946); Gaines v.
Long Mfg. Co., 234 N. C. 34o, 67 S. E. 2d 350 (1951).
AGGRIEVED SHAREHOLDERS UNDER THE S.E.C. STATUTES 523
to include "to dispose of"; and to "buy" is defined to include to "otherwise acquire."8
Is not a holder of a class of shares who has voted or been voted into a fundamental
change in his shares in effect "disposing" of his old set of rights (his old shares)
and "acquiring" a new set of rights? And is it not reasonably arguable that when
he (and his class) is asked to vote, he (and his class) is being asked to sell out the
present position and buy into a new position and should have the same protection
against untruths, half-truths and non-disclosures as any buyer or seller? The SEC,
however, at an early day took the "no sale" view of such corporate changes; the
present SEC Rule, 7 however, goes no further than to say that for the purpose of
the registration and prospectus requirements of the Securities Act no sale is involved
in such corporate changes."' In the only reported decision to date, the court took
the no-sale view of the change in securities effected through a merger, agreeing,
without discussion, with the (then) view of the SEC's amicus curiae brief.8 9 Whether
a court would now be influenced by the changed view of the SEC, ° and -hold
contrary to this judicial decision is anybody's guess'
BuTER's SECTION 12(2) ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES As AGAINST STATE LAW
Measured against his common law or equity prospects under the traditional
doctrines relating to deceit and to rescission, the buyer, even after successfully clear-
ing the jurisdictional hurdle of the federal channels, finds the following dis-
advantages under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act:
I. The Section is available only against the seller, not against others who by their
deceit may have induced the purchase.
2. The seller is in the clear under Section 12(2) if he can show that he was not
at fault in making the misrepresentation; classical rescission, on the other hand, can
rest on "innocent" misrepresentation.
3. The misrepresented fact must be "material" under Section 12(2) even if the
misstatement was intentional; classical rescission, on the other hand, dispenses with
materiality, under the decisions of most states, if the fraud was intentional.92
4. The Section 12(2) cause of action is subject to the short "one-and-three" year
period of limitations.
9 3
5. If, having sold the security, the buyer seeks damages under Section 12(2), the
damages recovered will, from the rescission-flavor of Section 12(2), presumably be
measured by the out-of-pocket rule; 4 on the other hand, if the seller's act amounts
" Securities Act §2(3); Exchange Act §3a(I3) and (14).
"'Securities Act Rel. No. 3420 (1951), 17 CoDE FED. RaGS. §230.133 (i953 Supp.).
88 See discussion in Loss, SECURITTES REGULATION 334 et seq. (195i).
o National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Jr. University, 134 F. 2d 689 (9th Cir. 1943).
" See SEC statement in Securities Act Rel. No. 3420 (1951), CCH FED. SEC. LAw SERv. 2128.oi.
" See discussion by Loss, supra note 88, at 339 n. z19, of instances in other SEC legislation where
fundamental changes are treated as "sales" or "purchases."
0I RESTATE MENT, RESTITUTION §§9, 28; RESTATEmENT, CoNTRACTS, §471, comment i; RESTATE iENT,
ToRTs, §538, comment g.
aSecurities Act, §x3.
o' Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 Y.LE L. J. 227, 244 0933)-
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to common law "fraud," the damages in some states in an action for deceit are
measured by the loss-of-bargain rule. 5
On the other hand the buyer (if he has cleared the jurisdictional hurdles) may
find in Section 12(2) the following advantages:
i. He may get relief (damages) under Section X2(2) even though he has dis-
posed of the security. Under state law he might find money recovery impossible
because the facts may not constitute a cause of action in "deceit," and rescission
doctrines would be of no help because he cannot restore the status quo.
2. The scienter requirement and its plaintiff's burdens of proof are absent in
Section 12(2). Indeed, no burden of proof of seller's fault of any kind is on the
plaintiff buyer; it is up to the seller to establish the defense that he did not know and
in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or omission.
3. The buyer need not prove that he relied on the falsity or omission, nor does
he have to prove that by the exercise of reasonable care he could not have ascertained
the falsity or omission,96 whatever be the local state rule on that point; he need only
prove that he did not know of the untruth or omission. This should not be con-
fused with the requirement that the buyer has to prove that the stated or omitted
fact is "material.1
9 7
4. The buyer may expect a more liberal view of what constitutes a misrepresented
"fact" than in some, at least, of the state courts.98
5. Under Section 12(2) the buyer can resort to the federal courts. Indeed, the
buyer has an attractive choice: he can sue under Section i2(2) in the federal courts,
he can sue under Section 12(2) in the state courts, and he can sue in the state courts
(or in federal courts under the "diversity" jurisdiction) on the state-law cause of
action.° In a Section 12(2) action the plaintiff buyer also has a wide choice of venue
in the federal courts and the advantage of nation-wide service of process0 0
Since this discussion is concerned with deals relating to shares of close corpora-
tions, we need not explore the relative merits for the buyer of Section 12(2) over
state blue sky remedies. By virtue of exemptive provisions, the typical blue sky
law does not ordinarily reach "private" deals, although it may be otherwise in an oc-
casional state.
'" MCCORMICK, DAmAGES §121 (1935).
"'Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939), afl'd, 113 F. 2d 988 (Ist Cir. 1940).
" As to "material" facts see REs'rAT'EMENT, TORTs §538(2).
gg Compare the possible intimation of Judge Clarke in Rosenberg v. Hano, 521 F. 2d 818 (ad Cir.
1941), that the broker's representation that the stock would rise 15 points might constitute a cause of
action under §12(2), with the view of a majority of the judges of one state court fthat a laundry
machinery manufacturer's representations that his new machinery would do the laundry-man.buycr's
work "more economically and with less labor" than his present machinery (made by this same manu-
facturer), are only "opinion," not misrepresentations of "facts." American Laundry Machinery Co.
v. Skinner, 225 N. C. 285, 34 S. E. 2d 9o (x945).
"Securities Act, §22(a) provides that the federal district courts and the state courts shall have con-
current jurisdiction of suits in equity and actions at law to enforce any liability created by the Securities
Act. State courts cannot reject jurisdiction so conferred by Congress. Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386
(A947).o Securities Act §22(a).
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PLAINTIFF'S X-IoB-5 ATRACTIONS, As AGAINST STATE LAw
The chief disadvantages of X-ioB-5 lie in the somewhat unsettled questions,
already discussed as to:
(i) Whether X-ioB-5 applies at all to deals in shares of close corporations, i.e.,
"private" deals. (However, this can perhaps now be regarded as settled.)
(2) Whether the cause of action under X-ioB-5 extends at all to buyers.
(3) Whether, if it is capable of such extension, it is fettered or unfettered by the
restrictions accompanying Section 12(2) of the Securities Act.
(4) The extent to which the use of federal channels is necessary to bring
X-ioB-5 into play. (But collateral use seems sufficient.' 0 1)
(5) Whether X-ioB-5 is available to one who has neither bought nor sold but
who complains, say, of a pre-emptive offering schemed to dilute him.
(6) Whether "privity" or "some semblance of privity" is required for an X-ioB-5
action-meaning, by "privity," not privity of contract but that the person relying on
the misrepresentation must have been within the ambit of persons whom the de-
fendant actually intended to harm by the misrepresentation. In deals in shares in
close corporations this "privity" issue is not likely to be crucial, for the misstatement
of which the plaintiff will be complaining will ordinarily be that of a defendant
who was the other party to the contract or of some defendant (most probably an
insider) who not only could reasonably have anticipated that persons like the
plaintiff would rely on the misrepresentation but who, indeed, intended that this
plaintiff would rely thereon.
The attraction of X-ioB-5 for a plaintiff lies in its broad sweep with respect to
(implied) civil liability. The forbidden acts are broadly characterized in the Rule's
three lettered paragraphs; to paraphrase, liability arises from (a) using any scheme to
defraud, (b) making an untrue or half-true statement of a material fact, or (c)
doing anything that operates as a fraud or deceit on anybody, so long as the pro-
scribed act is "in connection with the sale or purchase of any security"; and the
liability extends to "any person"--all subject to such limitations upon these generali-
ties as courts may develop.' On the whole, in view of the general protection of
"investors" sought by the federal legislation, the courts have shown little of the re-
strictive common law attitude that one associates with, say, the action for deceit.
"Fraud" (and "to defraud") and "deceit," as used in X-IoB-5, are not to be limited
by the common law standards of fraud and deceit.0 3 Indeed, complete silence may
constitute the forbidden "scheme to defraud" of paragraph (a) as well as the "fraud
... Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F. 2d 627 (gth Cir. 1953).
o 
2 The argument that X-ioB-5 is unconstitutional, as being in contravention of the Fifth Amendment
(due process), by reason of vagueness, indefiniteness, and uncertainty if the words "fraud" and "deceit"
as used therein seek to impose higher standards than are imposed under their common law connotations,
was dismissed, with citation of authorities, as "shop worn" and rejected by other courts" in Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 831 (D. Del. 1951) (Leahy, J.).
... See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., supra note io2; Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 83 F. Supp.
613 (E. D. Pa. 1947).
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or deceit" of paragraph (c) of the Rule, °4 even if it escapes the half-truth proscrip-
tion of paragraph (b).
Pending further specific decisions on X-ioB-5, the attitude of the federal courts
with respect to factors relevant to liability based on misrepresentation can perhaps
be forecast from other provisions in these SEC Acts. Under Section X7(a) of the
Securities Act, for instance, opinions, promises or representations as to the future
can support a charge of "fraud."'0° A false statement in a Registration Statement
of present intention is a misstatement of "fact," violative of the Securities Act.'
If the misrepresented fact must be "material" (as under paragraph (b) of X-IoB-5
and the similarly worded paragraph (2) of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act), it is
no defense that an ordinary person would not have been fooled; it is enough, that the
"credulous" have been or (in an injunctive proceeding) would be fooled.'07 As for
intent to defraud and scienter, even in criminal prosecutions for engaging in a
"scheme.to defraud" (which is the language of the Mail Frauds Act and of Section
I7(a) as well as of X-ioB-5), mere belief in the truth of false statements is no defense
if the falsity could have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence.0 It
may be, however, that under at least the "scheme to defraud" language of paragraph
(a), and perhaps even under the "fraud or deceit" language of paragraph (c)
of the Rule, a belief in the truth of a statement is a good defense if based
upon reasonable grounds for so believing after a reasonable inquiry into its
truth, as against a belief, say, based on grounds that "wQuld be an insult to the
intelligence of any businessman of experience."'0 9  But under paragraph (b) of
X-ioB-5 conceivably even an honest mistake after use of due care to learn the truth
would seem to give rise to liability, although if the action is by a buyer against his
seller the court might read into the Rule the well-founded-honest-belief limitation of
Section i2(2) of the Securities Act; if the court does not do so, there is presented
that paradox previously discussed, a paradox that, as we have seen, is not altogether
avoided even if the court puts no such limitation on a buyer's action against persons
not parties to the sale or on a seller's action. Perhaps in an X-IoB-5 action based
upon misrepresentation, a buyer plaintiff would be well advised to allege and prove
the defendant's (at least, a defendant seller's) "guilty knowledge," even though it be
a watered-down scienter, on the theory that such a plaintiff would carry enough of
a burden to justify freeing him from restrictions like those in Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act, thus minimizing the "paradox" argument!"
There is nothing in X-ioB-5 to indicate that "reliance" by the aggrieved party
104 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., supra note 102.
'United States v. Grayson, 166 F. 2d 863, 866 (2d Cir. 1948) (criminal proceedings).
16 Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. S. E. C., ioo F. 2d 888 (ioth Cir. 1939) (review of SEC stop order
proceedings).
107 S.E.C. v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N. D. Calif. 1939) (injunction proceedings under said
Section 17(a) by SEC.).
'"sStone v. United States, 113 F. 2d 70 (6th Cir. 1940).
109S.E.C. v. Macon, 28 F. Supp. 127 (D. Col. 1939) (injunction proceedings by SEC under §x7(a)
of the Securities Act).
110 See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., supra notes 45-47 and corresponding text discussion.
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on the untruth or omission is dispensed with. Even traditional equitable rescission,
which the philosophy of X-ioB-5 perhaps incorporates,"' requires reliance."-2 Re-
liance, in turn, ties in with the "privity" concept, for that label is often given to the
requirement that a misrepresentation must have been intended, or at least reasonably
expected, to induce reliance by the plaintiff or by the class which includes the plain-
tiff. The conservative common law position is that in business deals the defendant
is liable to the relying plaintiff only if he intended that the plaintiff (or a class which
includes the plaintiff) should have relied on the misstatement and even then only if
in relying thereon plaintiff entered upon the type of transaction in which the de-
fendant intended to influence the plaintiff or his class." 3 By that view if an in-
sider should deliberately put out false high earning statements so that he can sell
his shares at a good price, he is probably not liable to those who, relying on his
statements, buy from another stockholder. (He only intended to defraud those who
bought his shares?) The Farnsworth Radio case, previously discussed,1 4 seems to
embody this conservative common law attitude under its "semblance of privity" re-
quirement in an X-ioB5 action. True, the opinion leaves an avenue of escape from
its restrictiveness: there was no allegation that the plaintiff, suing the defendant
insiders, relied on the false statement. Although one may quarrel with this sug-
gestion of required individualistic reliance when the statement is published to the
world to influence the market and "the market" does, presumably, rely on the pub-
lication, one may feel entided to view that case as consistent with the proposition
that the "privity" requirement is satisfied if the defendant can reasonably have
expected that the plaintiff or the class which includes the plaintiff would have been
induced by the misrepresentation to buy or sell in reliance thereon, as the plaintiff
did. In a close corporation the issue of personal reliance versus reliance as part of
the market does not arise. Indeed, in a close corporation, the occasion to distinguish
between "intent" to influence the plaintiff in the deal and "reasonable expectation"
that the plaintiff would be influenced is unlikely to arise with frequency. Moreover,
in venturing prediction in this field, one must not overlook the criticism evoked by
the Farnsworth Radio case" and its inconsistency with the general spirit of this
federal legislation as well as with such liability for misleading statements as is im-
posed by Section i8(a) of the Exchange Act.
Insiders, Non-disclosure, and X-4oB-5 . It is particularly in the field of non-dis-
closure by insiders buying from shareholders that X-ioB-5 came into prominence."6
At common law, in a purchase by a director or officer of shares from a shareholder,
traditional legal lore tells us that there are three rules: (i) the stranger-analogy rule
(no greater duty on such a buyer than on a stranger to reveal to his seller facts
... New York's anti-fraud act relating to securities, which contains language in parts remarkably
like that of X-ioB-5, has been analogized to equitable rescission for innocent misrepresentations. People
v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N. Y. 33, X54 N. E. 655 (1926). N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §352 (the
"Martin Act").
s1- RESrATEMENT, CONTRACTS §476, comment c; Shulman, supra note 94, at 233.
... RESTATEmENT, TORTS, §531. ... Supra p. 520.
" Supra note 81. ... See cases cited supra, notes 4-8, 36.
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known by the buyer but unknown to the seller which make the wares more val-
uable); (2) the fiduciary rule (directors and officers stand in a fiduciary relation to
the shareholder whose shares they are buying, hence under duty to disclose such
facts); and (3) the "special circumstances" rule (duty of insider to disclose in "special
circumstances," an example of which is the pendency of negotiations for the sale
of the corporate properties at a high price). Even if one were to urge the thesis that
the actual decisions of the courts are not so divergent as their doctrinal pronounce-
ments1 7 it still remains true that here is a field where differences in judicial attitudes,
as well as in attitudes outside those circles, can be expected, even if everyone agreed
on the same verbal formula. It may well be, therefore, that a plaintiff who detects,
or believes that he detects, on the part of the local state court a tendency toward the
stranger-analogy attitude would do well to consider resorting to X-oB-5 . For ex-
ample, in one case the very same facts that gave rise to an X-ioB-5 action were held
by the same court to create no cause of action under local state law, in that case
Kentucky law, where an insider was buying from a shareholder without disclosing
material inside information."8 With respect to X-ioB-5 Judge Leahy observed, in a
subsequent proceeding in that case, that"l9
The rule is dear. It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stockholder, to purchase
the stock of minority stockholders without disclosing material facts affecting the value
of the stock, known to the majority stockholder by virtue of his insider position but not
known to the selling minority stockholders, which information would have affected the
judgment of sellers.
Despite the apparent leaning of the foregoing statement toward the fiduciary rule,
as is characteristic of X-ioB-5 decisions, 20 the cases that have actually arisen under
X-ioB-5 have involved either actual misrepresentation (or at least half-truths) by
the defendant or at least those "special circumstances" of non-disclosure which, it is
1  This writer ventures that adherence to a "special circumstances" rule, coupled with a close
analysis of those circumstances, is a more fruitful approach than contentions about the prevalence of
this or that rule about existence of a "fiduciary duty." However, no analysis can reconcile with the
main body of modern doctrine, nor justify, such extreme cases as Connolly v. Shannon, io5 N. J. Eq. xi5,
147 Atl. 234 (1929)-
..8 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 7 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947) (granting defendant's motion
for summary judgment on the common law count but denying it with respect to counts based on
X-ioB-5). Subsequently, in a decision on the merits, the court reconsidered and reversed its position
with respect to the common law count, on the ground that in the light of the evidence, the statements
made by the insider-purchaser were so misleading as to constitute common law fraud and deceit. Speed
v. Transamerica. Corp., 99 F. Supp. 8oM (D. Del. 1951). Compare on the common law aspect, the
decision by the same court in an identical transaction against the same defendant: Geller v. Transamerica
Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625 (D. Del. 1943), especially on petition to review, 63 F. Supp. 248, 255 (D. Del.
1945) (dictum: no breach of common law duty under Kentucky law, even if insider-purchaser had
already formed a plan to dissolve the corporation and thereby capture, on liquidation, the high value of
its properties).
"' Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 8o8, 828-829 (D. Del. 1951). Although Judge Leahy
added that one of the purposes of the Exchange Act is to protect public security holders against misuse
of inside information by insiders, X-ioB-5 has been applied, as already noted, to purchases by insiders
in a close corporation. See other cases cited supra notes 4, 5, 6, and 8.
'2A duty-to-disclose attitude under X-ioB-5 is found also in other cases. E.g., Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 Supp. 798, 8oo (E. D. Pa. r947).
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believed, would have induced most courts (except perhaps those of New Jersey) to
grant the plaintiff relief even under state law. The non-disclosure in those cases
related to such matters as the insider-purchaser's preexisting secret negotiations to sell
the corporate properties for a high price, 2 ' or current secret negotiations for an im-
portant acquisition by the corporation, 2 ' or his plan, already formed, to use his
power to liquidate and thus to capture for himself the corporation's liquidating
value, which exceeded the going-concern value." Indeed, in the Transamerica liti-
gation, Judge Leahy dropped remarks which might lead one to believe that some
such "special circumstance" is essential for an X-ioB-5 non-disclosure action and that
mere non-disclosed knowledge by insiders of facts making the shares more valuable
is not enough for an X-ioB-5 action;.2 . however, it must not be overlooked that he
found that the non-disclosure in question would have been harmless had it not been
tied up with the already formed plan to liquidate' 5 So, even under Judge Leahy's
remarks in the Transamerica case, which seem to be the most favorable to be found
for the defendant in an X-ioB-5 non-disclosure case, the test seems to be, after all,
whether the non-disclosed fact would have influenced the seller's judgment. This is
definitely more favorable to the plaintiff than the so-called majority rule in state
courts' 2 6 One may anticipate, under this test, that mere non-disclosure of identity
of the insider who uses a straw man to buy up shares in a close corporation is enough,
without further special circumstances," for an X-ioB-5 recovery, at least unless the
purchaser can prove that the price was fair.!'
That X-IoB-5 embodies the fiduciary rule need not lead to the in terrorem argu-
ment that no insider can buy "without first letting the shareholders in on his knowl-
edge, foresight, reading of the times or other motives for buying."'2" The litigated
cases reveal a cashing in on knowledge far different from a mere "reading of the
times."
It may be observed that the above indicated attitude of the federal courts toward
X-ioB-5 can readily be made to fit into the Rule's literal language if, as appears from
the previous discussion, the term "fraud" is not given its strict common law meaning.
The court should have no great difficulty in finding that the proscribed non-disclosure
violates at least paragraph (c) of Rule X-ioB-5 as an act or practice which operates as
"' Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 780 (E. D. Pa. 1947).
.
2 Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N. D. Ill. 1952).
... Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 8o8 (D. Del. 1951).
"'Id. at 814, 81i.
... In writing to other shareholders offering to buy their shares at a stated price, the majority share-
holder did not disclose that the corporation's tobacco inventory, which was shown in the last report to
shareholders "at cost" of $7,56,970, had a market value of $17,000,000. judge Leahy apparently found
as a fact that if there had been no intent to liquidate, disclosure of the increased inventory would still
have permitted the buyer to secure the stock at the stated prices. Id. at 826. Other triers of facts
might well come to a different finding in this situation, it is believed.
221See 3 FLETCHER, CoRPoRATroNs §ii68.i (1947 replac. vol.).
... Cf. Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal. App. 2d 371, 159 P. 2d 980 (1945) (common law recovery).
28 See, as to misgivings about the fiduciary rule, Walker, The Duty of Disclosure by a Director
Purchasing Stocks from His Stockholders, 32 YALE L. J. 637, 639 (1923).
530 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
a fraud," or paragraph (a) as a scheme to defraud; courts have even shown a disposi-
tion to bring in paragraph (b), the half-truth proscription, in these non-disclosure
cases.'
30
The disclosure duty under X-ioB-5 has been imposed not merely on directors and
officers but on the insider dominant shareholder as well.131 Whether a state court
purporting to follow the duty-to-disclose rule against purchasing directors or
officers would do likewise with respect to dominant shareholders is not clear, for lack
of judicial decisions. A plaintiff pursuing such a defendant might be more in-
clined, therefore, to use X-ioB-5.
For that matter, X-ioB-5 has potentialities for further extending the range of
non-disclosing defendants. Be it noted again: under X-IoB-5 it is unlawful for any
person to do the forbidden acts, not merely any officer, director or dominant share-
holder. For instance, it would seem that if the corporation itself is buying from a
shareholder the duty of disclosure should be as extensive as if an insider were
buying.132 One X-IoB-5 complaint that withstood a motion to dismiss was against
the purchasing corporation, although it is not clear that the selling shareholder was
complaining merely of nondisclosure.133 Even a redemption of preferred shares (or
other senior securities) might be a violation of X-ioB-5 if coupled with non-disclosure
of facts which, if known, might induce the holders to exercise a conversion privilege. 13 4
Also, despite doubts that have been expressed to the contrary,13" a minor employee
should perhaps not be excluded from an X-ioB-5 duty to disclose; one might venture
that a secretarial employee violates Rule X-ioB-5 if she uses knowledge of special
circumstances, acquired in the course of her work, to purchase shares from a share-
holder. Rule X-ioB-5 , as interpreted, shows no predilection for that view which
sees a duty running only to "the corporation" and not to the selling shareholder.
It has been suggested that even an "outsider" who picks up private information in
the course of business negotiations with a corporation might violate X-ioB-5 in se-
cretly using that information to buy up the corporation's share,' although one
... Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 83 F. Supp. 613 (E. D. Pa. 1947).
...See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E. D. Pa. 1947); Speed v. Trans-
america Corp., 99 F. Supp. 8o8, 828 (D. Del. 1951).
' Speed v. Transamerica Corp., supra.
232 See Comment, 59 YA.LE L. J. X120, 1I49-1154 (195o); cf. Note, 59 HARv. L. REv. 769, 776
(1946); Gladstone v. Murray Co., 3X4 Mass. 584, 50 N. E. 2d 958 (1943) (here the officer buying for
the corporation was said to owe a duty to do his best for the corporation and not to owe a duty to the
selling shareholder; however, the court reached the same result even with respect to shares purchased by
that officer-stockholder for himself).
.. Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N. D. I11. 1952). Perhaps
Zahn v. Transamerica, 99 F. Supp. 8o8, at 843 fl. (D. Del. i95) looks in the same direction. Loss,
SacusRMns REGuLTION 831 (I95I) expresses the view that X-ioB-5 overrides any conflicting obligation
of management to buy at bargain prices.
... See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 8o8 at 843 ff. (D. Del. 3953); see also, Zahn v.
Transamerica Corp., 162 F. 2d 36 (3 d Cir. 1947).
135 Note, 59 H-v. L- REV. 769, 774 (r946).
'"Note, 39 CAt.iF. L. REV. 429, 434 (1951); Comment, 59 YALE L. J. 1320, 1144 (1950). The
situation hypothesized in the latter is where Corporation A plans to buy out Corporation B's assets or
securities at a high price and a director of A goes out and buys shares in Corporation B at an under-
price. See also Loss, SeCURITs REGULATION 829 n. 67 (1951).
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wonders how far courts would go with that idea.
In a transaction in shares of a close corporation, it would not be surprising if
courts were to hold that X-IoB-5 is violated by one who, without disclosure of that,
fact, buys from a shareholder on the basis of specific inside information which he
knows comes from an insider who would himself (the insider) fall with X-ioB-5.'3 7
The recipient of a "trade secret" in analogous situations takes subject to a con-
structive trust on his gains; perhaps X-ioB-5 can do likewise for this other recipient
of breach-of-trust information' 8 Also, it might be only realistic to raise at least a
presumption having weight as evidence that close corporation purchases by a mem-
ber of an insider's immediate family are made on the basis of the insider's knowl-
edge. To conceive of such purchasers as participants in an "act that would operate
as a fraud" on the selling shareholder would seem not out of keeping with the
philosophy of X-IoB-5, even if a more tolerant view be taken, at least at common
law, of market purchases by insiders' relatives or because of insiders' tips, in view of
their greater impracticability of disclosure.' 39
When it comes to sales by an insider, as well as by the corporation itself whether
on original issue or reissuance, the non-disclosure aspect in a deal in shares of a close
corporation is likely to merge ihto actual misrepresentations or at least half-truths,
for it is difficult to visualize such a sale without some sales talk, some representations.
In this respect, an insider's sell-out in a close corporation presents a different picture
from an insider's sale "in the market" on the basis of inside bearish information. 4
0
Accordingly then, the buyer into a close corporation will have been aggrieved by at
least half-truths and will find several provisions seemingly available to him under
this legislation, viz., X-IoB-5 paragraph (b), Section 17(a) of the Securities Act,
Section i2(2) of the Securities Act and, though rarely in close corporation deals,
Rule X-15CI-2(b) relating to half-truths by a broker or dealer. Whether these half-
truth provisions offer a plaintiff any advantage (again, in light of the buyer's X-ioB-5
troubles, previously discussed) over state law will depend on how "advanced" local
law is with respect to recognition of half-truths as misrepresentations.
Further X-ioB-5 Attractions? A glance at the broad X-ioB-5 proscriptions of
schemes to defraud, half-truths and acts and practices that would operate as a fraud,
coupled with a glance at the decisions already cited under X-ioB-5, suggests that the
plaintiff under X-ioB-5 gets the benefit of at least the most "liberal" common law
views, if indeed not more. Would a preferred shareholder who has been redeemed
after liquidation had been decided upon and who will get less on redemption than
on liquidation have an X-ioB-5 action even if full disclosure is made? It would seem
x See Note, 39 CALiF. L. REV. 429, 434 (1951).
"
8 Id. at 437 ff., relying on REsrATEmENT, RESTITUTION 20I (2).
'=" Cf. at common law, on purchases in the market by insider's mother, wife, and friend where,
however, the seller was not complaining, In re Calton Crescent, Inc., 173 F. 2d 944, 949, 95095, (2d
Cir. 1949), and dissent by Learned Hand. A.#d sub nom. Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338
U. S. 304 (1949) (no consideration of the point). See also Note, 39 CALiF. L. REv. 429, 435 (1951).
... Cf. Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S. D. N. Y. 1951), afl'd,
x98 F. 2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
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so, 4' although perhaps even a "liberal" common law recognizes his grievance. 42
Will the buyer negotiating for the purchase of corporate property with an insider
whom he knows or suspects to be buying up his associates' shares at an under-price
be liable to the seller under X-ioB-5 ? Perhaps so'3 One soliciting a sale (or pur-
chase, presumably), even though not himself a purchaser (or seller) and though
making no false statements, may be liable as a knowing participant in the scheme to
defraud, under X-IoB-5.'
Moreover, the X-ioB-5 liability, as well as liability under Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act, extends to every person who controls any person liable under those
provisions, by the express provisions of Section 20 of the Exchange Act and Section
15 of the Securities Act, respectively, subject to somewhat differing "innocence"
qualifications under the two sections.
Jurisdictional and Venue Advantages of X-ioB-5. As in the case of liability,
under Securities Act Section 12(2), the plaintiff may have a fairly wide choice of
forum under X-IoB-5, except that the choice is restricted to the federal courts. The
plaintiff may bring his suit in the district where the violative act or transaction oc-
curred or in the district where the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or trans-
acts business, and process may be served in any other district where the defendant is
an inhabitant or wherever he may be found.'45 Since there are technical differences
between the venue provisions relating to liability to a purchaser under Section x2
of the Securities Act and those relating to the X-IoB-5 liability under the Exchange
Act, this divergence can raise again the question whether a defrauded buyer can
choose an X-ioB-5 liability or is restricted to the Section 12(2) liability and its nar-
rower venue.' 4" The fact that the act of which the plaintiff complains is also an
actionable wrong by local common law or statutory law does not bar suit in the
federal court under X-IoB-5, or under any other provision of these federal statutes or
SEC Rules thereunder.' 4  The various restrictive doctrines surrounding diversity
jurisdiction are, of course, irrelevant to suits based upon these federally created
causes of action.
Remedy under X-zoB-5. The aggrieved seller suing the purchasing insider
has been held entitled to recover for his share of the profits made by the purchaser
"'Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 843 ff. (D. Dcl. 1951).
...Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., x62 F. 2d 36 (3 d Cir. 1947).
... The point became eliminated from the decision in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp.
798 (E. D. Pa. r947)-
1" Fry v. Shumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E. D. Pa. X947). "In fact, it would be sufficient if they
had merely mailed a letter without knowing its contents or even had merely supplied their stationery,
providing they knew that in so doing they were rendering service essential to or participating in a
scheme of fraud." Id. at 478 (Kirkpatrick, J.).
""Exchange Act, §27. For examples of extraterritorial service under X-ioB-5, see Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co.,.73 F. Supp. 798 (E. D. Pa. 1947); Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 8o F.
Supp. 123 (E. D. Pa. 1948); Stella v. Kaiser, 82 F. Supp. 301 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
'Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., supra, took the restrictive view. The problem is part of the
"paradox" problem previously discussed, supra p. ooo.
"'Stella v. Kaiser, supra note 145.
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who, having thus acquired all the stock, sold the corporate assets at a high price; 48
recovery has also been allowed for damages, measured by the difference between what
defendant paid and what the stock was worth. 4 ' Rescission would also seem avail-
able.' ° The possibility of the remedy of a shareholder's derivative suit, on behalf
of the defrauded corporation whether buyer or seller, is not to be overlooked.'
The Period of Limitations under X-zoB-5 . An action under X-ioB-5 by the buyer
against the seller in a close corporation deal presents of course that unsettled question,
already discussed, whether he is subject to at least the restrictions of a Securities
Act Section 12(2) case, including the one-and-three year limitations applicable to
that Section, if his grievance falls within that Section, as it generally will. A
plaintiff who has not bestirred himself into rather prompt litigation may, accordingly,
prefer to take his chances with state law rather than risk an X-ioB-5 case only to
find that it is after all only a Section 12(2) case which is barred either absolutely by
the lapse of three years or by the lapse of one year because he could have discovered
the untruth within that time if he had exercised reasonable diligence.'t2 Usually the
state period is longer, frequently (depending on the state) being extended by the
period of the plaintiff's ignorance of the fraud.
The foregoing troublesome aspect aside, an X-ioB-5 plaintiff will on the whole
be no worse off, limitations-wise, than in resorting to a state-law cause of action.
Since there is no specific period of limitations relating to X-IoB-5 and since there
is no general federal statute of limitations, not even for federally created causes of
action, the federal court in an X-ioB-5 litigation will apply the local state statute of
limitations,1' 3 at least if the plaintiff is not pursuing an equitable remedy like rescission
or accounting for profits so as to bring into play the federal doctrine of laches re-
lating to federally created equitable causes.' 54 Although it is arguable that, no
matter which remedy an X-ioB-5 plaintiff is pursuing, the local state limitations
statute, including one which starts running before discovery of the fraud, is ap-
plicable anyhow, since the X-ioB-5 remedy is not exclusively equitable, 55 it is also
arguable that in fraud cases the federal doctrine that the period of limitations on a
federally created cause of action does not start to run until the plaintiff discovered
or ought to have discovered the fraud still applies, for, as stated in a Supreme Court
x Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E. D. Pa. 1947).
'~ Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 8o8 (D. Del. 195); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness
Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N. D. Il1. 1952). See also Fry v. Shumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E. D.
Pa. 1947) (damages against non-buyer participants).
15
o tee Fry v. Schumaker, supra.
... See Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F. 2d 799 (3d Cir. X949) (corporation as seller);
Stella v. Kaiser, 82 F. Supp. 301 (S. D. N. Y. 1948) (corporation as buyer).
.. Securities Act, §13.
1.. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F. 2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness
Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (952); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S. D. N. Y. 1949)-
Incidentally, two of these X-soB-5 cases involved a buyer plaintiff.
... See Cope v. Anderson, 331 U. S. 461 (1947) and cases there cited, especially Russell v. Todd,
309 U. S. 280 (1940).
... See cases in preceding footnote. The point was perhaps involved, but was not discussed in
Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., supra note 153 (state statute held applicable).
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case, "it would be too incongruous to confine a federal right within the bare
terms of a State statute of limitations unrelieved by the settled federal equitable
doctrine as to fraud, when even a federal statute in the same terms would be given
the mitigating construction required by that doctrine."' 0  Frequently the local
state statute of limitations has a shorter period for a liability created by statute than
for a fraud action; it is not clear whether in an X-ioB-5 action the federal court
will purport to apply the local state court characterization or will itself characterize
an X-ioB-5 action as in essence a "fraud" action. In the only X-ioB-5 case passing
on the point, it seems that the federal court made its own characterization of the
action as fraud, although it indicated that the state view was the same. ""
CONCLUSION
One conclusion is fairly obvious: whether a plaintiff who deems himself ag-
grieved by a sale of shares in a close corporation would be better off suing under
state law or under this federal legislation depends so much on the law of the state
in question that no categorical generality can be ventured. Perhaps the suggestion
is warranted that a wronged seller is at least as well off, and probably much better
off, suing under X-ioB-5. The wronged buyer may be well advised to take his
chances with state law unless by that law his prospects are definitely on the dark
side. The aggrieved holder who is neither himself the buyer nor seller nor suing on
behalf of the buyer or seller (as in a shareholder's derivative suit) also perhaps had
better stick to state law, despite certain suggestions in the foregoing discussion, un-
less his chances there are dim indeed or unless he is fired with the ambition to put
his name to a leading case.
... Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 397 (1946) (not an X-soB-5
case); see also to same effect, Winkler-Koch Engineering Co. v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., ioo F. Supp.
15, 29 (S. D. N. Y. 1951) (triple damages under the Clayton Act).
""Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F. 2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
